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Abstrac t

Differen ces in the speed and success of developi ng countrie s in achievin g
transiti on to modern economi c growth can be explaine d by differen ces in the
natural resource endowme nts of these countrie s.
A fundame ntal hypothe sis of this paper is that major policy instrume nts
(such as the interes t rate, the foreign exchange rate, monetar y expansio n, the
wage rate, the rate of protecti on, etc.) are politica l instrum ents for
promotin g growth by transfer ring income among social groups. The
politici zation of these policy instrum ents becomes deeply entrench ed when the
presenc e of rich natural resource s provides incentiv es for the pursuit of
unprodu ctive and/or ineffici ent rent-see king activiti es (as in the Latin
America n experien ce). In the absence of a rich natural resource endowme nt,
the
necessi ty of depolit icizing the economic system becomes paramou nt to ensure
sustaine d economi c growth. This leads to a gradual but consiste nt adherenc e
to
liberali zation in the credit, product , and foreign exchange markets (as in the
Taiwan case).

The economi c agenda becomes one of fully develop ing and
harness ing the country 's human resource s instead of protecti ng and vesting
certain elites with rents fueled by the exploita tion of a rich natural resource
base.

Towards a Model of Development for the Natural Resources Poor Economy
Gustav Ranis*
Yale University
I

Introduction
There can be little doubt that future historians will view the

effort at transition into modern growth by the contemporary less
developed countries as perhaps the major economic and political event
of the second half of the twentieth century--outdistanced only by the
development of atomic energy.

The effort by two-thirds of humanity to

try to move their systems from situations of colonial agrarianism
· towards what Kuznets has described as the epoch of modern economic
growth is surely a monumental societal undertaking.

In the now so

called_mature industrial countries this process, of course, began with
the Industrial Revolution in England during the last quarter of the
18th century.

Fro·m there it spread gradually across Europe and into

North America, Japan and the Soviet Union, but stopped short of
involving the so-called overseas territories--thus, in fact, helping to
create the existing current dichotomy between the developing countries
and the industrially advanced countries.
This modern economic growth phenomenon encompasses major
structural change away from agriculture in terms of both value added
and employment over time by means of enlisting the routinized and
institutionalized exploration of sci_ence and technology in its manifold
applications.

It entails a most profound change in the way of life of

*This chapter has benefitted from very helpful comments by Larry
Krause on an earlier draft.
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a society as well as in the institution al environmen t that helps
~egulate economic activity.

This new way of life has been deemed

attractive and irresistibl e, and seems to be the objective of most of
the third world--almo st regardless of initial conditions, cultural
milieus or even ideological preferences .

Accordingly , the effort which

spread geographica lly from England to the Continent, the U.S., Germany,
Canada and Japan in the 19th century and to Eastern Europe as well as
parts of Latin America in the early 20th century, was only temporarily
interrupted and resumed· with greater vigor as well as impatience in the
post-indepe ndence, post-war era.

The development effort we are now

witnessing thus really represents the resumption of the spread of that
transition growth effort to Asia, the rest of Latin America, and to
parts of the Middle East, with Africa bringing up the rear.
It has, moreover, become increasingl y apparent in recent years
that of all the contemporar y LDC transition efforts, the so-called East
Asian NICs, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, have been
most successful.

In addition, we believe that Japan, an unquestione d

case of earlier success; had much in common, in terms of initial
nineteenth century conditions, with these contemporar y East Asian
situations.

Furthermore , it is quite obvious that what the entire East

Asian family seems to have in common is relative shortage of natural
resources-- with the possible exception of the favorable entrepot
location of Singapore and Hong Kong--in association with heavy
population pressure on limited land, a relatively good human resources
base, and a relatively small size.
The contemporar y East Asian NICs, just as Japan in the late 19th
century, may thus be labeled as belonging to a group of open dualistic
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economies characterized by the co-existence of a large agricultural and
a small non-agricultural production sector internally, and by the
relative importance of international trade externally.

As compared

with other post-war LDCs, these systems have clearly been more

successful by any criteria contrasting East Asian performance with that
of La tin American and other Asian countries over the post-war period
(see tables 2a and 2b).

As is well known by now, these countries have

indeed clearly done well on all counts, in other words; not only in
terms of per capita income growth, but also in terms of the generation
of sufficient employment to mop up their labor surpluses by the end of
'the 60s and the maintenance and even improvement of an equitable
distribution of income during exceptionally rapid periods of growth.
What is', however, still less well understood is the "why" of this
succes's, as well as the extent of transferability of the experience to
the differently situated, differently placed, developing countries of
La tin America, South East Asia, Africa, etc.

It is not at all obvious

why the initial conditions more or less shared by these five
countries--their poor natural resources endowment, the relatively high
quality of their human resources, the heavy pressure of their
populations on the land, and their relatively small or medium size-
should all add up to a natural advantage in effecting a successful
transition to modern growth.
While it is fashionable nowadays to say that the answer to success

resides in "good management", that these countries somehow pursued
"good" economic policies, this also does not take us far enough.

It

is, as we shall see, undoubtedly correct--but we must also try to probe

deeper and again ask ourselves, "why?"

In other words, it is clear
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that there must be some politico-economic forces at work which led to
the adoption of relatively better policies in these countries than
elsewhere, and which permitted them not only to generally perform
better, but also to be able to adjust much more flexibly to the
deterioration of the international environment during the past decade.
It is our hope to relate the initial conditions cited to the issue of a
conformable evolution of policy and, in so doing, try to render both
the longer term policy direction of a society and the absence of undue
oscillations in that policy, at least to some extent endogenous.

In

other words, a satisfactory approach to understanding a particular
· model of development relevant to this type of developing country must
go beyond a ~escription of what happened, and try to relate it to
politi~o-economic forces within the-system.
While most of the prior work on the analysis of transition growth
has focused on the discovery of statistically measurable regularities
in countries' performances and production structures over time, the
deviations from that average convergent pattern have usually been
explained in a rather ad hoc, descriptive fashion.
characteristic of the·work of Chenery

1

and Kuznets

This is certainly
2

as well as of many

of the descriptive analyses of the East Asian historical cases in the
literature. 3 Perhaps the time has now come to try to focus on precisely

why, in these minority of cases, a conformable evolution of policies
has resulted in a trend of a more or. less linear set of policy changes,

while, in the majority of LDCs, we have been witness to inconsistency
and policy oscillation, in spite of the profusion of advice to the
contrary offered by academics, international organizations, etc.

It is

no longer sufficient to dismiss the East Asians as "special cases" but
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necessary to ask what, if anything, can be learned from them, once the
experience itself has been endogenized, and to see whether anything is
relevant for other developing countries still largely marching to a
different tune.

This is the basic motive for attempting to explore the

model of development of the natural resources poor LDC in this chapter.

The search for a. prototypical case, of course, always runs up
against the problem of each individual country's inevitable
"specialness," and even within our sub-family of five there are
obviously marked differences which could take up much of our energy and
space.

We have therefore decided to focus most heavily on one case,

that of Taiwan, partly because it is best known to us, and partly
because Singapore and Hong Kong can be easily eliminated as extremely
atypical city-states.

We will, however, also make reference to both

South Korea and historical Japan, while maintaining our main focus on
the Taiwan case as a prototype for the exploration of the natural
resources poor (NRP) development model.

We will also find it useful to

provide a contrast to some of the natural resources rich LDCs (NRR) as
illustrated by the "typical" La tin American case.
Traditionally, the analysis of policy stresses its economic
impact on growth, distr~bution, employment, labor allocation, trade
patterns, etc. in assessing its economic costs and benefits.

Analysis

typically does not examine the question of why,,ce:T,tain policie·s were
adopted and/or abandoned in the first place.

The fundamental

hypothesis of this chapter is that major development policy
instruments (the interest rate, the foreign exchange rate, the rate of
monetary expansion, the rate of protection, the tax rate, the unskilled
wage rate, etc.) must be interpreted as political instruments to
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achieve certain social objectives, benefitting some classes at the
expense of others, and that there are usually good and sufficient
reasons for certain countries pursuing what might be called "bad
policies," while the East Asians have generally pursued "good
policies."

We do not, in other words, intend to simply accept the

superiority of wisdom or straight cultural advantages as an explanation
for the differential paths followed by the East Asians and the rest of
the developing world in the post-war era.

Moreover, we intend to

demonstrate that the relative shortage or abundance of natural
resources represents a key ing~edient of the explanation.
Section II will focus on the set of initial conditions shared by
the family of natural resources poor countries (NRPs) in contrast to
the natural resources rich countries (NRRs) in the context of
transition growth.

Section III describes the actual evolutionary

performance via differential sub-phases of transition growth which has
been in evidence in the two types of LDCs.

Section IV focuses on the

"why" of this divergence, emphasizing especially the political economy

importance of the natural resource endowment.
Section II

Initial Conditions

Post World War H Taiwan, like South Korea and like Japan in the
third quarter of the 19th century, exemplifies quintessentially the
natural resources poor country model.

Not only were there no large

deposits of exportable minerals or reproducible raw materials in
existence, but even the amount of good arable land was limited, (22% of
the total land area in Taiwan, 257. in Korea, 147. in Japan) and the
population density on that available land was high (see Table 1).
scarcity of basic natural resources, critical to the thesis of this

Such
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chapter, is, of course, never an absolute matter.

Yet at the simplest

level of causation, it means that with the natural temptation to find
an "easy solution" rendered inoperative by the absence of abundant
natural resources to be exploited along the way, the overall success of
the typical NRP has to be explained in terms of the ability to exploit
"something else," something that_!! available, namely human resources.
The successful mobilization of a system's human resources, in
turn, must be associated with collective traits conducive to modern
growth.

These include, according to Kuznets, secularism,

egalitarianism and nationalism.

As he put it, "secularism is the

concentration on life on earth that assigns priority to economic
attainment.

Egalitarianism means the denial of any inborn differences

among human beings unless and except as they are manifested in human
economic activities ••• All this is bound by nationalism, the claim of
the community of felling grounded in a common historical past. 114
The so-ca~led pragmatism of the East Asian populations which
affected, as we shall see, their policy choices and their success,
undoubtedly represents a mixture of these three elements, all of which
are to some extent associated with an initially high level of literacy
and other societal attainments.

But the critical element is a belief

in a reward system which encourages the deployment of existing human
capacities.

The tradition of secularism, in other words, means a

preoccupation with the here and now and not with the other-worldly
quite the reverse of some of the images of a dichotomy between Eastern
other worldliness and Western pragmatism that one frequently finds in
the literature.

Egalitarianism in the Kuznets interpretation is the

fundamental belief that social distinction is expected to be awarded to
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those who perform economic tasks with distinction.

The belief in the

equalization of opportunity through the educational system over time,
plus participation in markets on a re_latively equal footing at any
point in time, clearly represents an important ingredient of success in
East Asia, where both competitive examination systems and equitable
land tenure systems exhibit strong elements of this egalitarian credo.
Finally, nationalism as conceived by Kuznets was very much in
place in Taiwan and the other East Asian cases.

What might be called

"mature nationalism" is basically acquired from an awareness of one's
own history and the belief that_ one continues to exist as a member of a
group--the understanding that some public cohesion and a sharing nexus
may be required, at least for some time, putting limits on acquisitive
individualism.

In other words, there exists a basic feeling of concern

for the larger national, more or less homogeneous, community--even
though there, of course, always exist differences, for example, as
between the indigenous Taiwan population and the migrants from the
Mainland.

The trick is to translate this sense of an essentially

common heritage into behavioral rules which are conducive to the
institution of orderly reforms_ that express calculated sympathy with
other members of the community, without endangering the underlying
principles of a self-interested and acquisitive ~eward system.
5
historical Japanese case well demonstrates the point.

The

Such "organic

nationalism" is to be differentiated from the situation where, in the
absence of these conditions, the government often seems to value an
activist role almost for its own sake--for the headlines and the
expectations it produces;

Such a manifestation of what may be called

"synthetic nationalism" is often associated with the willingness of

9

governments to take actions now, the costs of which don't have to be
faced for some time.

With national cohesion already in place (as in

East Asia) there is less need to continue to mollify conflicts among
competing interest groups by means of inflation and the other
componenets of import substituting interventionism.
In Taiwan, it was the tradition of pragmatism, coupled with the
fact that a mature nationalism already existed and did not have to be
invented by the newly independent government, which meant that it was
easier for the population to come to realize that government bad
important functions to perform, but should not be exclusively relied
upon to dependably provide the goodies over time.

It does not stretch

·the imagination too far to see the significance of these elements in
determining the nature of a· system'~ transition growth effort.

They

are clearly conducive to an increasingly market-oriented economy, (the
pursuit of a gradual liberalization process in various markets) or,
another way of putting it, the gradual depoliticization of the economic
system.
Traditional analysis of transition growth stresses the economic
impact on such matters as employment, growth, labor allocation, trade,
~tc., assessing the economic costs and benefits without much reference
to political economy arguments.

A central component of the approach of

this paper, on the other hand, will be to examine not only the policy

impact of various structural changes, but also the process by which
they are adopted and/or abandoned within a given political milieu.

As

stated ·above, the fundamental hypothesis underlying our analysis of the
natural resources poor economy, therefore, is that major development
policy instruments (the interest rate, the foreign exchange rate, the
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rate of monetary expansio n, the wage rate, the rate of protecti on,
etc.) must be interpre ted as politica l instrum ents for promotin g growth
by transfer ring income among social groups, in other words, to
"manufa cture profits" for one class at the expense of another --a task
initiall y facing every newly indepen dent governm ent.

It is the early,

if gradual , abandonm ent of massive interven tions of this type which
marks off the East Asian NRP's from much of the rest of the third
world.
In this context it is helpful to differe ntiate between "on the
table" or overt revenue and expend! ture related policies of governm ent
and "under the table" or covert and implici t income transfer s among
various groups.

In the context of an essenti ally politica l process ,

the "under the table"· transfer s are usually sane tioned by a powerfu l
need to solve short-ru n problem s, with the possibi lity of social
conflic t being put.off to a later point in time.

The aforeme ntioned

major policy i~strume nts are often used in this "under the table"
fashion .

For example , incomes are artifici ally transfer red, say by

overval_ ued exchange rates or by inflatio n, in ways very differe nt from
those of the market system, supplem ented by governm ent taxation and
expendi tures, used in t~e advanced economi es towards which the ·
transiti on growth efforts are pointed .

The deploym ent of covert policy

instrum ents not only touches almost everyone indirec tly, as is well
recogniz ed in the literatu re, but also plays an importa nt politic al
function , as is less well recogniz ed.
In contras t, the "on the table" or explici t policies --includ ing
sectora l taxation and expendi tures on educatio n, on science and
technolo gy, on social overhead investm ent, and for public enterpr ises,
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mies-- serve
all real or allege d cases of public goods or extern al econo
to accommodate the transi tion proces s in the sense that such
laisse z
interv ention s tend to be a· part of the game in even the most
faire advanc ed econom ies.

We in tend to develo p the thesis here that,

the
while the initia l politi cizati on is common to almos t all LDCs,
trend of
rate, exten t, and linear ity of" the subseq uent libera lizati on
the
some econom ic system s, prima rily involv ing a shift from "under
the
table" to "on the table" policy interv ention s, are relate d to
ping
natura l resour ces wealth or povert y of the partic ular develo
countr y.

Clearl y, such a shift does not neces sarily mean a dimini shed

t
·role for the govern ment, but merely a change d role as its direc
of
functi ons may actua lly increa se with the contin ued progre ss
libera lizati on, even as its indire ct functi ons dimin ish.
What differ entiat es the evolut ion of policy in the NRPs is the
relati ve linear ity of movement in the direct ion of gradua l
libera lizati on, in contra st to policy oscill ation elsewh ere.

In the

uous
natura l resour ces poor model we witnes s a more or less contin
trend,
metam orphism , albei t with fluctu ations , of course , around the
l NRR
while we encou nter cyclin g withou t a clear trend in the typica
case of Latin Americ a and South- East Asia.
What we would theref ore like to stress here is that the NRP
politi cal
develo pment type has been witnes s to a gradua l withdr awal of
of its
forces from variou s crucia l marke ts over the more than 35 years
develo pment experi ence.

The underl ying notion is that if a countr y is

to perform well, as Taiwan clearl y has, and to achiev e not only
ped
produc tion and struct ural contou rs simila r to those of the develo
is
count ries but also the associ ated organ izatio nal featur es, it
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inevitable that these political forces must gradually become less
important and the implicit policy interventions must yield to the
explicit type.

Otherwise, LDCs are bound to continue to pay a heavy

toll in terms of both policy oscillation and inferior economic
performance.

In that sense, the changing performance as well as the

organizational features observed in the NRPs should not be viewed as
mere historical accidents, but as part of a broader political economy
nexus that requires explanation and is tied up with the initial
conditions cited above.

Section III

The same, of course, holds for the NRRs.

Contrasts in Transition Growth

Our very notion of transition growth presumes an evolutionary view
of economic development.

This metamorphic stance envisions the

existence of subphases in the course of transition to Kuznetsian modern
growth, with each subphase characterized by a distinct set of
structural characteristics and a distinct mode of operation helpful for
the analysis of post-independence performance.

By this we don't mean

to imply any sense of inevitability attending movements along a fixed
historical pattern, only to record what can be observed as a set of
evolutionary phenomena.
During.the colonial or pre-transition period, the East Asian NRPs
(like the Latin American or South-East Asian NRRs) routinely consumed
imported factory produced non-durable consumer goods, while exporting
traditional agricultural products (in the case of Taiwan, rice and
sugar).

While Taiwan possessed somewhat more favorable

natural/geographic features in terms of climate, soil, and the
potential for multiple cropping and related land-saving technology
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the Japa nese emph asis on
chan ge, both Kore a and Taiw an bene fitte d from
n and such inst ituti onal
such infra stru ctur al inve stme nts as irrig atio
inve stme nts s farm ers' orga niza tions .·
tran sitio n phas e,
The basi c stru ctur al cond ition s of this prelabe lled

s0

for the typic al NRP, is shown in diagr am la.

The

food supp ly, F, as well
agri cult ural sect or, A, prod uces the dom estic
whic h help to finan ce the impo rt of
as trad ition al expo rts, E,
a
h as text iles) consu med
manu factu red non- dura ble consu mer good s Mt (suc
by the hous ehold sect ors, H.
typi fied by Taiw an,
Give n this colo nial heri tage , the NRP, here
rt durin g s1 with the
initi ated her modern tran sitio n grow th effo
as shown in diagr am 2a.
custo mary prim ary impo rt subs titut ion patt ern,
, E, is now dive rted from
A port ion of the trad ition al expo rt earn ings
a
s, Mt, to the impo rtati on
the impo rtatio n of non- dura ble co~su mer good
of prod ucer s' good s, M.
p

This perm its the emer genc e of new impo rt

stic non- dura ble consu mer
subs titut ing indu strie s, In, prod ucing dome
prev ious ly impo rted Mt in
good s, Dt, whic h grad u~lly subs titut e for the
the dome stic mark et.

Such a grow th type , fuele d by trad ition al

titut ion phen omen a:
expo rts, enta ils two obse rvab le impo rt subs
n sens e, Mp /(M p+Mt) , and
subs titut ion in the forei gn exch ange allo catio
t+Dt ). Both indi ces
subs titut ion in the dome stic mark et sense ~ Dt/(M
d.
can be expe cted to rise mark edly over this perio

nal incom e can be
More over, forei gn trade as a perc enta ge of natio
, give n the fact that the
expe cted to decl ine durin g this same subp hase
from the colo nial patt ern
polic y syndrome whic h acco mpan ies it diff ers
by erec ting vario us
in that it stron gly favo rs dome stic mark ets
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protective devices in support of a new industrial class.

Given a long

run relative shortage of natural resources, a relative abundance of
unskilled labor, and a good educational base, the development of human
resources-- entrepreneu rial and managerial- -appropriat e for industrial
production must gradually become an essential ingredient of the growth
During subphase s , modern factory production for domestic
1
markets, often with the help of foreign capital, Sf, was rapidly
process.

expanded; traditional populations were converted into modern factory
workers; land based or commercial entrepreneu rs were converted into
industrial entrepreneu rs capable of absorbing modern science and
technology; and law and order oriented civil servants tended to become
development al change agents.
It is common knowledge that during this s1 subphase all the
policies of government are directed towards supporting the new
industrial class.

With profits taking on a windfall character not

directly linked to productive efficiency we usually encounter
inefficient capital intensive technology and output mixes, a neglect of
rural industry, and an even more serious neglect of the food-produc ing
agricultura l sector.

But what is especially noteworthy here is that

the East Asian countries chose a relatively mild version of the
syndrome; they neglected their agricultura l sectors less and maintained
lower levels of effective protection of their industries than is
"typically" the case.

Thus, while the well known package of tariffs,

import licensing, overvalued exchange rates, low interest rates, etc.,
all conforms to the stereotype, its execution in the East Asian
countries was milder and more flexible.
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As is also well known, this process of primary import substitution
growth, which lasted approximately a decade in the East Asian NRPs,
must inevitably come to an end.

The inevitability of its termination

rests on the fact that, once "all" non-durable manufactured goods
imports, Mt' have been substituted for by domestic output, Dt' any
further industrialization must slow to the pace of population and per
capita income change.

The resources flow picture which emerges at this

point, roughly in the early 60s, is shown in diagram 2a1•
Difficult social decisions, like whether to maintain the import
substitution strategy (but shift to the domestic production of
'previously imported producers' and durable consumer goods) or move
towards the exportation of the same non-durable consumer goods
previously. produced for domestic markets, now had to be made.

The East

Asian NRPs, after some hesitation, chose the latter, and entered the
subphase pictured in diagram 3a.

s2

This is termed "primary export

substitution" because the basis for comparative advantage in foreign
trade now gradually shifts from land to unskilled labor, with Et
exports gradually "subs ti tu ting" for E exports.
a

By the end of the

1960s their relative roles had, in fact, been dramatically reversed-from 90% land-based, to 80% labor-based (as seen in Tables 2c-2e)-
while the trend in the overall trade orientation, E/GDP, increased
markedly as a consequence of prodigious increases in labor-intensive
industrial exports (see Table 2f).
Moreover, the rate of labor reallocation (the shift of the labor
force from agricultural to non-agricultural pursuits over time)
accelerated substantially during this

s2

subphase due to a combination

of rapid agricultural productivity increase and the expansion of labor
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intensive industria l output now destined for relativel y unlimited
internati onal markets.

Once industria l entrepren eurial maturatio n

combined with the relative non-negle ct of food producing agricultu re
had laid the foundatio n, labor intensive export industrie s offered a
full opportun ity, really for the first time, to absorb the system's
underempl oyed on a massive scale.

This labor-bas ed "vent for surplus"

led to a pronounce d increase in the rate of domestic intersect oral
labor reallocat ion, culminati ng in not only a relative, but an
absolute, decrease in the agricultu ral labor force, and, in the course
of little more than a decade, the exhaustio n of the labor surplus
condition , as indexed by nearly constant unskilled wages giving way.to
rapidly rising wages.

This export substitut ion mode, it should be

noted, implies both vigorous domestic intersect oral growth and a
substanti al integratio n of the East Asian economies into the world
economy.

It meant a spurt in domestic agricultu ral/non-a gricultur al

exchanges , as well as a spectacul ar expansion of internati onal trade.
At the same time, in spite of considera ble political and strategic
uncertain ties--esp ecially in the case of Taiwan-- capital inflows more
than replaced the earlier infusion of concessio nal foreign capital.
Such a shift into export substitut ion must, of course, be
accommod ated by a difficult to achieve shift in public policies.

Any

enhanced orientatio n towards internati onal markets on a competiti ve
basis requires, first of all, a shift from an inflation ary {under the
table) method of taxing the landed interests on behalf of the new
industria l classes, to one of more explicit {on the table) taxation.
It requires, moreover,

a reduction

in protectio n, the adoption and

maintenan ce of more realistic exchange rates, interest rates closer to
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tion to
their shadow levels , and the contin ued a~oida nce of the tempta
s
artifi cially increa se elite indus trial worke rs' wages and depres
domes tic agricu lture' s terms of trade.

The transi tion to expor t

substi tution in East Asia was also facili tated by such direct
zones and
govern ment action s as the establ ishme nt·of expor t proces sing
expor ts, as
the rebati ng of import duties on raw mater ials destin ed for
transi tional device s.
This primar y expor t substi tution or
has its limits .

s2

subph ase, of course , also

Once the unskil led labor surplu s has been exhau sted,

began to
as it was by the early 70s in East Asia, unski lled real wages
-rise in a sustai ned fashio n.

Compe titive indus trial outpu t and expor ts

l
tended to become more skille d labor- , techno logy-, and capita
intens ive, and the subphase. of second ary impor t and expor t
substi tution ,

s3 ,

(see diagra m 4a), was gradu ally entere d.

As their

furthe r,
skill, entrep reneu rial, and techno logica l capac ities increa sed
the
Taiwan and Korea since the mid-70 s have, in fact, moved into
sing of
produ ction of capita l goods, consum er durab les, and the proces
sly for
raw mater ials for the domes tic marke t, and, almos t simult aneou
ance of
expor t, with the degree of simul taneit y relate d to the import
tic marke t.
econom ies of scale in the contex t of the size of their domes
, in the
At the same time, the slack in the system 's agricu ltural sector
ution"
form of sustai ned produ ctivity increa ses of the "Green Revol
type, had been substa ntiall y mopped up.

As the agricu ltural sector

the rest
become s less of a leadin g sector and more of an append age to
resour ces
of the economy, the basic need for food impor ts in a natura l
poor system increa singly asser ts itself .

As indica ted in diagra m 4a,
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and export markets (E) with
East Asia now supplies both domestic (D)
p
p
producers' goods, while importing an increasing volume of food (Mf).
The per capita growth rates in Korea and Taiwan during their more
than a quarter century of transition growth have been remarkably high
(see Table 2a).

At least as interesting is an examination of their

employment, labor share and size distribution of income performance
which have also been outstandingly favorable by any standard.

We

should not, of course, be too surprised by an improvement in equity
during S~, once the labor surplus bas been absorbed, wages rise and
industrial output shifts according to the product cycle, in continuing
response to changes in the endowment.

This is in accordance with both

cross-sectional evidence and the crude theorizing surrounding the
inverse-U-shaped or Kuznets curve ~ypothesis.

6

What is of special

interest, however, is that the distribution of income seems not to have
worsened, but to .have even improved substantially during the period of
most rapid early transition growth, especially s2 (see Table 2b), which
runs counter to overall LDC experience, and counter to the inverse-Ushaped hypothesis.
The East Asian countries under discussion provide striking cases
9f a remarkably strong growth performance, especially during their

s2

phases in the 60s, combined with low and falling levels of income
inequality, due largely to initially high and rising relative shares of
labor, and rapid absorption of unskilled labor hours in new rural and
urban activities during the decade.

The distribution of rural

families' merged "agricultural incomes" also showed an improvement
during the 50's and 60's not only due to the initially favorable
effects of land reform, but also because technologies were developed
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and promoted that rendered small farm holdings more productiv e over
time.

This was a function both of the more intensive use of land via

double cropping, and of the shift to new, more labor-int ensive, and
higher valued crops such as vegetable s and fruit for the domestic
market, and mushrooms and asparagus for the foreign market, in contrast
to the more land intensive tradition al crops.

Such shifts in cropping

pattern were of particula r benefit to the poorer (smaller) farmers who
were able to participa te more than proportio nately in these activitie s.

Turning now to the Latin American or NRR case which, of course,
hides a great deal more heterogen eity within itself, the most striking
characte ristics are their more favorable initial man/land ratio and
natural resource endowments generally , their more concentra ted rural
assets structure , their somewhat larger size, and their somewhat higher
initial levels of wealth and income.

Neverthe less, as we indicate in

diagram lb, the initial colonial resources flow pattern during S0 in
the Latin American case bears a substanti al resemblan ce to the East
Asian case (the exportati on of mainly land-base d raw materials --mostly
in exchange for mainly
minerals and tropical cash crops-- E,
a
industria l consumer goods, Mt ).

Essential ly the same holds true for

s , the easy import substitut ion subphase of transitio n starting in the
1

Depressio n years of the 1930s (some say earlier), but focusing once
more on reallocat ing the proceeds from the tradition al natural resource
based exports, mainly to finance new non-durab le consumer goods types
of import substitut ing industrie s.
It should be noted that growth rates during the post-Worl d War 11
primary import substitut ion period were, on the average, as high in
Mexico and Colombia as in East Asia, undoubted ly related to the higher
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levels of initial endowments and per capita incomes in Latin America
On the other hand, the primary or "easy" import

.(see Table 2a).

substitution policy package there may be judged to have been more
severe, partly perhaps as a consequence of its substantially longer
duration (from the 30s to the early 60s).

One important consequence of

this was a relatively much greater neglect of the food producing
agricultural sub-sector, reinforcing colonial policy antecedents which
concentrated attention on the lucrative extractive enclaves.

In short,

both types of countries share an infant industry rationale which calls
for the creation of a new industrial class out of the landlord or
commercial elite, with the help of reasonable levels of protection and
profit transfers.
The most striking difference, however, resides in the choice made

s1 ,

at the end of
transition.

the primary import substitution subphase of

Faced, as were the NRPs, with a decline in the rate of

industrial growth and the threat of price wars in protected domestic
markets for consumer non-durables, the NRRs decided to continue with
the import substitution mode, but now focussed on the manufacture of
producers' and durable consumer goods -- first for the domestic market
and, somewhat later, ·for export as well ( see diagram 4b).
This metamorphosis seems to parallel,. at first blush, the
secondary import and export substitution sub-phase recently reached by
the NRP cases.

But only at first blush.

The most crucial difference

is that the system now moves directly from primary import substitution
into the production of the more skilled labor, capital and technology
intensive products instead of by way of primary export substitution.
Thus, not only was the protection and controls-oriented policy
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structu re mainta ined, indeed its further deepen ing and strengt hening
was brough t about.

So, during the 1960s (after the end of primary

d
import substit ution) , while the rates of effecti ve protec tion decline
somewh at in East Asia, they rose in most of Latin Americ a.

Intere st

rates genera lly remaine d at low, if not negati ve, real levels; the
agricu ltural sec tor's terms of trade continu ed to be depres sed; and
even traditi onally food self-su fficien t or food export ing countr ies
became net import ers.
Moreov er, given the still narrow domest ic market s for the produc ts
of seconda ry import substi tution , especi ally in the 70s, the NRR's
have, in fact, pushed for and achieve d some sizeab le increas es in their
non-tr adition al, indust rial exports (see table 2e).

While some of this

expans ion has admitte dly been in the consum er non-du rable goods area,
particu larly shoes and textile s, most of it has taken place in such
higher technol ogy, higher capita l intens ity areas as automo biles,
electri cal machin ery, chemic als, and even- aircra ft.

In many cases it

is related less to the march of dynamic compar ative advanta ge or the
produc t cycle than to the govern ment's willing ness to subsid ize
indust rial exports which are by now genera lly recogn ized as the
hallma rk of succes sful develop ment.

This indust rial export phenomenon thus differs marked ly from the
primary export substit ution subphas e encoun tered in East Asia, and
instead entails the promot ion of exports on top of a deepene d import
substit ution regime .

It is disting uished both by a differe nce in the

d
compos ition of indust rial output , by the fact that it is not precede
by a pronoun ced change in the overal l policy packag e, and by the
prevale nce of substa ntial subsid ies.

Under it, particu lar indust ries
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or firms are selecte d for direct encoura gement via public sector tax
rebate s, differe ntial intere st rates and export subsid ies, or via
of
enforce d private sector cross-s ubsidi zation , like assurin g compan ies
continu ed high windfa ll profits in protect ed domest ic market s in
exchan ge for complia nce with rising export targets .
Both the compos ition of export s, as between traditi onal and non
traditi onal (see Tables 2c ,d,e}, and the change in the overal l exp.ort
orienta tion (see Table 2f). presen t a startli ng contra st between the
NRPs and the NRRs, with the NRRs remain ing much more oriente d toward
natura l resourc es, fuel, and domest ic market s.

Also, in the NRRs, the

s
_relati ve neglec t of food produc ing agricu lture, already noted during 1
, is exacerb ated during

s3

as protect ionism deepen s.

As a conseq uence,

with more and more traditi onal granar ies empty, more of the cash crop
export s procee ds, supplem ented by foreign capita l, must typica lly be
devoted to food import s.
The prolong ation of import substit ution in this fashion , with
export promot ion eventu ally added, is eviden tly likely to be social ly
costlr. even if private ly profita ble (for obviou s reason s}.

But the key

fact is that with a favorab le natura l resourc es base it can be "paid
in
for", as exports and ta~ proceed s can continu e to pay the piper, and
so doing help mainta in very respec table growth rates (see table 2a}.
What is less clear, howeve r, is whethe r the consequ ences of this
"skippi ng" of the
from

s1

into

s3

s2

export substit ution subpha se, and moving direct ly

are accept able from the employ ment and distrib utiona l

points of view.

Turning to the employ ment and income distrib ution outcom es, the
differe nt transit ion paths chosen yield very differe nt bottom lines.
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In the rural sector, the combin ation of a worse distrib ution of land
with the relativ e shift toward s, rather than away from, traditi onal
a
primary export cash crops tends to make for lower labor intens ity and
higher (less favorab le) agricu ltural income Gini.

Rural non

agricu ltural income s, which are more equally distrib uted than are
agricu ltural, constit ute only 15% of farm family income , declini ng to
10% over time in Colomb ia, in contra st to the initia l 30%, rising to
60%, in Taiwan .

Moreov er, such rural industr y and service s as exist,

much more
given the mainten ance of the import substi tution regime , are
capita l intensi ve and contrib ute much less to favorab le employ ment and
distrib utiona l outcom es than they would in an NRP-ty pe regime .

Rural

indust ry's labor share in Colomb ia, for exampl e, was much lower (and
falling ) than was Taiwan 's over virtua lly the entire period under
discuss ion here.

The same sources also indica te a sizeab le gap in the

urban labor share as between the two countr ies.

The much less

favora ble, and worsen ing, distrib utiona l outcom e associa ted with the
Latin America n choice of a growth path should therefo re come as no
surpris e.
All the statist ical evidenc e which can be brough t to bear thus
indica tes that the NRPs pursued a more or less linear path of policy
liberal ization and registe red far and away the better develop ment
perform ance.

On the other hand, in the NRRs we witnes s a differ ent,

less clear cut, and more oscilla tory pattern of policy or
organi zationa l choice s, with market oriente d episod es displac ed by the
occasio nal return to import substit ution types of interve ntions , and

much less succes sful outcom es in terms of the assessm ent of econom ic
perform ance.
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It is indeed a challenge for the profession to try to move towards
a better understanding of the fundamental causes of this divergent
pattern.

In that sense it is necessary to proceed beyond the above

description of divergent growth performance (the skipping of a
particular subphase in the case of the. NRRs) and towards a comparative
development perspective which includes the evolution of organizational
and policy choices as part of the explanatory framework.

A better

understanding is needed as to why, in the NRP case, a more or less
conformable evolution of policy resulted in the linearity of policy
change, while in the NRR case we have been exposed to more or less
continuous oscillation in spite of the profusion of "good advice"
offered by the profession and the donor community.

It is to this

political economy explanation of the divergence of performance which we
now turn.

IV

Natural Resources and the Political Economy of Transition

Growth
In our discussion of import substitution we identified six main
instruments of interventionism :

the interest rate, the exchange rate,

the rate of monetary expansion, the rate of effective protection, the
tax rate, and the unski~led wage rate.

It is our basic contention that

what has characterized NRP success is the gradual but consistent
adherence to liberalization in these various markets over time.

This

meant, in part, that interventions in period s were milder than in the
1
NRR case in the first place, and more importantly, that liberalization
trends were maintained thereafter even as the international situation
deteriorated from time to time as a consequence of oil crises,
recession abroad, inflation, protectionism, etc.
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With respect to the first dimension, the policies in place in
Taiwan did not differ very much from those in other developing
countries during

s1--except

for their relative mildness.

Taiwan's

policy makers set out to deploy the major macro policy instruments to
achieve two main purposes:

first, to promote the relatively new

industrial sector through the.creation of profits for domestic
indu-s trial entrepreneurs; and, second, to create revenues for the
government.

As was noted above, these two purposes, creating profits

and creating revenues, represent political acts.

While both tariffs

and quantitative restraints hold off foreign competition, monetary
expansion, along with import licensing, low interest rates, and other
direct allocations, permit windfall profits or rents to be awarded to
the industrial and importing sectors, while the agricultural and
exporting sectors are squeezed.
Most LDCs, in fact, view the increase in the supply of money as a
way of putting purchasing power into the hands of the government so it
can accomplish certain developmental objectives.

The fact that the

resulting inflation may also muddy the water of relative prices by
which people allocate goods and services rationally is often a not
undesired outcome; it' is a means of obscuring the transfer of resources
that has taken place among various groups.

At the individual level an

expansionary monetary policy on the part of the government can be
traced in part to the fact that there is an erroneous generalization by
society as a whole that a plentiful supply of money has pleasant
effects on individual beneficiaries, and that even those who are
adversely affected get the benefits of a time lag.

For the government

it is tempting to view the creation of purchasing power through the
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printing press as a powerful instrument for acquiring goods and
services in the market and for achieving larger resource mobilization
for the system as a whole without having to seek taxation through some
sort of consent by the population.
lrlhile such a move, of course, is easily tolerated when national

survival is at stake, many contemporary LDCs resort to the same
convenience in the absence of such an emergency.

There is simply a

general desire to make the tax burden less explicit and smaller, to
avoid opening it to debate and/or to obscure the fact that government
has this ability to create its own purchasing power.

Thus, while

inflation is generally symptomatic of the evasion or postponement of
. the assumption of some of the responsibilitie s by government, and is
often tolerated by a narrow social consensus, this was not the case in
the NRPs.
An expansionary monetary policy clearly represents a substantial
convenience for a typical LDC government~

It is also a welcome

ble·ssing for the large scale industrial enterprises which can borrow
cheaply from the organized banking system.

lrlhile these businessmen may

not know the full theoretical implications of a rapidly expanding money
supply, they are clearly aware of the advantages to themselves of a low
interest rate cum expansionary monetary policy.

The credit rationing

that results is only occasionally a problem for them--it is the medium
and small-sized companies and the farmers who are unable to borrow at
these low rates.

Moreover, if money creation leads to inflation, debt

is made cheaper to repay.

Thus the expansionary monetary policy

typical of LDCs is popular with powerful segments of the business
community who expect inflation to "bail out" their borrowing.

Not only
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of taxat ion, it
is money creat ion and infla tion with a time lag a form
asing power of
is also an income trans fer mecha nism where by the purch
ts to the elite
the consum ing publi c is trans ferred as wind fall profi
busin ess class .

It is thus a polit ical act and an impor tant compo nent

in the typic al
of the impor t subst itutio n strate gy which was maint ained
LDC, but aband oned in Taiwa n and South Korea .

The ea~ie st way for the

allie s to obtai n
gover nment and its favor ite large scale indu stria list
this low inter est
the rents basic ally gener ated on the land is throu gh
an instru ment of
cum infla tion polic y, as the centr al bank is typic ally
throug h the
the gover nmen t's effor ts to acqui re purch asing power
, monet ary expan sion mecha nism.
monet ary
In the natur al resou rces rich LDC, infla tion throu gh
n excha nge rate,
expan sion is alway s intert wined close ly with the foreig
gy.
as a cruci al compo nent of the impor t subst itutio n strate

As is well

ed as a
known, the excha nge rate is also almos t unive rsally regard
t price
polic y instru ment rathe r than as an equil ibrat ing marke
regul ating the level of impor ts and expo rts.

In such an econo my,

t
overv aluati on of the dome stic curre ncy bene fits the impor
cit tax on
subst itutin g manu factur ing class and amoun ts to an expli
produ cers of expor t produ cts.

Here again we see the clear exerc ise of

they exist ,
polit ical power trans ferrin g windf all profi ts from where
mer, to the
the rural prima ry produ cing expor t secto r and the consu
urban manu factur ing secto r.

Produ cers of impor t subst itutes can buy

ly low price s and
impor ted raw mater ials and capit al goods at artif icial
icial ly high
sell the finish ed produ cts behin d tarif f walls at artif
price s.
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Such politica lly and artifici ally created cheapne ss of foreign
exchange certainl y makes it attracti ve to import at the officia l
exchange rate, but it also generate s two types of problem s.

First, the

availab le foreign currency must be rationed , leading to import
licensin g, again a politica l process , and the possible use of differe nt
exchange rates for differen t categor ies of goods.

Second, artifici ally

set prices usually lead to "paralle l" markets , a polite word for grey
or black markets , again with certain groups having a distinc t advantag e
over others.

Usually , as domes.tic price inflatio n continu es, the

officia l exchange rate is occasio nally devalued to at least partiall y
correct for its excessiv e overval uation.

However , the pace of

devalua tion typicall y lags behind the domestic inflatio n rate; as a
conseque nce the externa l purchas ing power of the domesti c

currency is

almost always higher than its interna l purchas ing power, as in even the
crude versions of the purchasi ng power parity theory.

Typical ly again,

the governm ent is usually hesitan t about the timing and scale of
devalua tions since it can easily be accused of aggrava ting pre-exi sting
domestic inflatio n as imported products immedia tely suffer price rises
in terms of the domestic currenc y.

Such a directly visible conseque nce

of a politica l act is unpalat able, especia lly when price increase s
natural ly apply to many items of mass consump tion.
But, on the other hand, if the governm ent does not devalue
occasio nally, domestic inflatio n means an increasi ng degree of
overvalu ation which makes imports ever more attracti ve, and places an
ever heavier tax on land based exports .

Moreove r, this hesitanc y about

whether or not to devalue usually strength ens the false belief that
domestic inflatio n is mainly import cost pushed, with the attentio n
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diverted from the fact that it was the excessive monetar:r expansion in
the first place that fed the inflation.

In this way, the government

creates for itself a complicated set of problems:

a controlled

exchange rate going hand-in-hand with a monetary expansion, itself a
function of the government's need to try to capture resources for
itself and favored private groups.

The complexity of the intervention

policies, in terms of the administrative systems that need to be
devised to replace the market and partially correct for the problems
created by direct interference in the first place, then leads to the
large-scale diversion of entrepreneurial resources to the pursuit of
.

·rents well described by Anne Krueger and others.

7

In the attempt to carry out an import substitution strategy with
the help of a substantial expansion of the money supply and an
overvalued exchange rate, the extent of initial natural resource wealth
provides an important possible constraint.

If the depressed profits of

raw material producers discourage production, it may well be that
natural resources can no longer be "squeezed" as effectively,
exacerbating problems in other areas; for instance, export product
related workers may have to be laid off, etc.

On

the other hand, if

the natural resources situation is comfortable, much more can be
squeezed out, and for a much longer period of time, which can include
finding new types of natural resource based exports (or foreign
capital) to keep the process going.
What differentiates the NRP from the more typical NRR type,
therefore, is that the extent of the NRP's import substitution policy
regime has to be more limited--its duration shorter, and its severity
more restricted.

We all know that primary import substitution must
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ultimately come to an end everywhere, especially in relatively small or
· medium sized economies once domestic markets are exhausted.

What is

less well understood is that it is likely to end earlier, ceteris
_paribus, in situations where natural resource endowments are poorer,
since, in such cases, traditional exports are not ample enough to
continue to fuel import substitution after it has reached its "natural"
termination in terms of the exhaustion of domestic markets for non
durable consumer goods.

Once excess capacity in textiles, etc.

appeared in Taiwan in the late '50s, the industry exerted pressure for
cartelization, market sharing, even the subsidization of exports
(dumping).

But after some considerable filling and backing, it was

recognized that the system could not "afford" this way of escaping from
its cul-de-sac, any more than by shifting to a strategy of secondary
import substitution.
The relative "mildness" of Taiwan's primary import substitution
subphase manifested itself in several dimensions.

For one, the usual

explicit discrimination against the agricultural sector, partly carried
out via imposed terms of trade deterioration (by means of the
rice/fertilizer barter syste~), and partly via relatively heavy
taxation of land-based exports, was relatively less severe.

Secondly,

the customary resort to low interest rates plus an inflationary tax to
shift resources "under the table" toward the new industrial urban
elite was less pronounced.

As early as the 1950s--during the height of

its primary import substitution subphase--the Taiwan authorities had
already directed their attention to bringing inflation under control by
means of interest rate reforms, along with monetary and fiscal cut
backs, as well as the timely help of foreign aid.

Industrializati on,
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in tandem with a dynamic agriculture and aided by the provisions of the
land reforms of 1949-53, was already exceptionally dispersed into the
rural areas.

Even the level of protection (the usual combination of

tariffs and quantitative restrictions) was exceptionally low, with QRs
abandoned in favor of tariffs, by 1958.
At the end of this relatively mild version of s , the proto
1
typi.cal East Asian NRP then shifted gradually into s , characterized by
2
export orientation of the primary export substitution type (which
constituted a shift toward the exportation of the same labor intensive
non-durable consumer goods previously produced for the domestic
market).

In order to achieve international competitiveness in these

. areas a substantial change in each of the various crucial policy areas,

all in the direction of enhanced liberalization, was required.

This

was accomplished through the famous nineteen points of reform during
the late '50s and_ early ~·6os, which included a further liberalization
of domestic financial markets, the unification and devaluation of the

exchange rate and the maintenance of more or less realistic levels
thereafter, plus the maintenance of fairly restrictive monetary, and
-especially, fiscal policies throughout.

It should be noted that the

~evel of tariffs was not radically reduced at this time nor were
international financial markets liberalized.
Taiwan, in fact, enjoyed a period of considerable price stability
throughout its most rapid growth decade, the externally oriented
1960s, an experience unmatched anywhere else in the developing world.
Even during the period of the pronounced world wide inflation of the
1970s inflation on Taiwan was only permitted to occur in short spurts,
interspersed with longer periods of relative price stability.

While
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"growth with stability" was a slogan first popularized in the 1950s,
largely in response to the dangers of Mainland hyperinflation,
inflation as a political expedient continued to be rejected even during
the period of the post oil shock 1970s when it would have been easy to
point the finger at cost-push explanations.

From the beginning, Taiwan

seems to have accepted the notion that, for the long term, sustained
severe inflation is a basically monetary phenomenon and thus, to
control it, it is necessary to curb the growth of the money supply.
This seems like a well accepted conservative tenet which is really an
important distinguishing characteristic of the East Asian model, though
occasionally abandoned in the South Korean case.
It i~, thus, the absence of an ample natural endowment to help
finance a Latin America-like direct progression from easy primary to
the more costly secondary import substitution sub-phase which, we
believe, was the key to the explanation of the comparative suceess of
the Taiwan economy.

Both the relative mildness of the earlier primary

import substitution sub-phase and the shift from import to export
substitution before moving into the more capital and technology
intensive output mixes can basically be laid at the doorstep of its
natural resources scarcity.

There was no alternative possibility of

pursuing a dependable path of employment and output generation by
combining the system's own natural resources with its abundant supplies
.
semi-skilled 1abor. 8
of unskilled and

In contrast, in the more typical Latin American NRR case, as the
exhaustion of domestic demand forces the inevitable termination of
primary import substitution, the economy moves into secondary import
substitution (durable consumer goods, capital goods and the processing
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of raw materials) skipping the labor-intensive s phase.
2

The dramatic

shift in the composition of exports in the NRP case, as well as the
dramatic shift in its overall export orientation, both in contrast to
the NRR case, was illustrated in Table 2c, 2d, 2e and 2f.

Put very

bluntly, as long as substantial windfalls exist, as in Latin America,
powerful interest groups will fight off changes in -b'le system as well
as be in a position to buy off pressures emanating from "outsiders,"
such as exporters, agriculturalists, and consumers.

Importers,

industrialists and civil servants continue to be the beneficiaries of
the policy package in s , and as long as the rents emanating from the
3
natural resource intensive exports are ample enough and can be
"squeezed out" via the indirect transfer mechanisms referred to
earlier, it is difficult politically to change the rules of the game.
There is neither desire nor necessity, and the existing strong
tendencies to continue to promote growth by various "under the table"
policy interventions in various markets will persist.

This means that,

while industrial entrepreneurs and governments continue to benefit, the
buiden continues to fall on consumers who have to pay higher prices for
inefficiently produced goods, as well as on the dispersed farmers who
are providing agricultural output, both for domestic and export
destinations.
These costs are, of course, bound to be even higher as the system
moves deeper into

s3

and tackles ever more capital- and skill-intensive

output and export mixes.

In fact, as we have pointed out,

s3

in the

NRR cases usually requires an increasing subsidization of industrial
exports and is thus more appropriately termed "export promotion" as
distinct from the "export substitution" of

s2

which results from the
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more nearly neutral set of policies between import competing and export

activities in the NRP case.

such a system can be economically

sustained only as long as it can be "afforded," in other words "paid
for" out of largely natural resources generated rents, and it can be
politically sustained only as long as domestic consumers can be
appealed to by way of the "synthetic" nationalism which governments
usually continue to trot out at this stage, and/or as long as they
remain ignorant of the additional burdens they are being asked to
carry.
During

s1 ,

essentially the same kind of policy syndrome is in

place in both the NRP and NRR:

an over-valued currency, import

controls, and substantial increases in the money supply--except that
the NRP version is milder and briefer.

In this very direct sense,

Taiwan's shortage of natural resources can be seen to have been a
substantial advantage.

With the exportation of her main primary

product exports, rice and sugar, reaching market limits by the late
1950s an alternativ~ approach became a necessity.

It was soon

realized, although the record of policy discussions of the late '50s
indicates a good deal of back-and-forth hesitation, that, since natural
resources were limited, the economy had to turn to its abundant labor
supply for the new engine of growth.

The shift from a natural to a

human resources base became a necessity.

The exchange rate, which had

been overvalued during import substitution, now was consistently

undervalued, contributing to the emergence of the frequent export
surpluses of the '60s and '70s, and assuring all the actors that the
government was indeed serious about its refusal to relapse into import
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substitution type policies even when threatened by external business
cycles and other shocks. 9
With respect to the level and method of taxation, it is, of
course, possible to mobilize resources without taxation by consent.
When a government incurs a budget deficit, increases the money supply,
and permits price inflation, these are part and parcel of the mechanism
for covert forms of taxation; they avoid the necessity of assessing,
negotiating, debating and imposing a system of taxes.

While such a

system of ambiguous, non-negotiated burden sharing in the development
effort is usually tolerated when national survival is at stake, it is
surprising that contemporary LDC's continue to resort to it in the
normal course of their transition growth effort.

Clearly there exists

an unwillingness to make the tax burden too explicit, too open to
debate, or to abandon the sheer convenience at the disposal of
government to create its own purchasing power and direct precisely how
it should be allocated.

In fact, the inflationary process described is

generally symptomatic of the desire to postpone "on the table"
responsibilities which require much more of a social consensus as to
who ought to pay the tax burden and who ought to benefit from
development expenditures.
In the.early stages of import substitution growth it is usually
tariffs which are imposed, partly for protective, partly for revenue
reasons, and they constitute mos~ of the existing tax yield.

This is

partly because of the convenient point specificity of their method of
collection.

There thus exists a commonality of interest between

governments requiring revenue and infant manufacturers requiring
protection--both provided via the use of high tariff walls as a crucial
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component of the import substitution policy package.

The adoption of

this tariff wall, of course, also represents an income transfer
mechanism in that the consuming public must pay for the inefficiency of
the infant manufacturers as they face higher prices for previously
imported consumer goods.

Thus, income is transferred by political

force, in the form of windfall profits, from consu~ers to urban
industrialists.

Since the now domestically produced items have

traditionally been scarce and expensive, many consumers may not even be
aware that this scarcity and the likely deterioration of quality which

accompanies it are created by political force.
In Taiwan, an income tax system was established in 1955; by 1961
the government's fiscal deficits had been brought under control.

By

1964 there was a budgetary surplus and the emphasis had shifted to
fiscal restraint, including the generation of surpluses over many years
as an anti-int'lationary device.

Here again we see the need, because of

the natural resource shortage, to shift taxes from a land based to a
human capital and, later, physical capital base.
Thus, previously referred to monetary reforms (raising interest
rates and moving towards greater central bank autonomy) and these
fiscal reforms ( tax' legislation shifting from land based to income
taxes on the rest of the system) represent major evolutionary steps in
the NRP-type country--all part of the gradual depoliticization of the
economy as income transfers and resource reallocations, once hidden,
are gradually discontinued and become subject to "on the table" public
scrutiny.

The displacement of the printing of money habit cannot, of

course, be accomplished overnight.

The typical LDC government's

ability to raise taxes is limited, and there will be an increased
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tenden cy to reduce impor t duties --not only to help with impor
t
libera lizati on, but also becaus e urban consum ers increa singly
come to
realiz e that they have been paying for the ineffi cienc y of the
domes tic
indus tries.

But only as libera lizati on in the first stage makes it

possib le to experi ence a substa ntial increa se in the GNP growth
rate is
a govern ment likely to be ia a positi on to close the budge t
defic it by
raisin g other taxes and effect ing the previo usly referr ed to
shift from
agricu ltural to non-a gricul tural levies .

A shift in the compo sition of

taxes, in other words, is likely to have to be associ ated with
an
increa se in the overa ll level of taxes (see Table 3).

Final ly, the

increa sed revenu es place the govern ment in a positi on of increa
sing its
other develo pment al functi ons via increa sed line minis try expen
diture s
on such things as scienc e, techno logy, agricu ltural resear ch,
educa tion, overhe ads, etc.
In a broade r contex t, the existe nce, and persis tence, of
substa ntial econom ic rents leads to the artifi cial suppo rt of
urban
areas and the neglec t of agricu lture, as we have alread y seen,
along

with its comple mentar y rural indus tries.

Politi cally, econo micall y,

and techno logica lly sensit ive cities repres ent the usual base
of
moder nizatio n, which includ es the capac ity to produc e inputs
for
agricu lture incorp oratin g modern scienc e and techno logy.

Howev er, the

accele ration of these linkag es throug h the line minis tries'
expen diture s is likely to be reserv ed for a later stage of any
libera lizati on.

The excess ive costs of too early or forced

urban izatio n, so typica l of the NRR case, was avoide d in the
NRP case.
The need to have a food produc ing agricu ltural revolu tion as
a
precur sor to, or better , a

compa nion of an indus trial revolu tion, in a
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balanced growth context, has been amply demonstrated in the NRP case;
they generally permitted their agricultural sectors to fulfill their
historical mission en route to becoming an appendage to the system.
D. Gale Johnson, elsewhere in this volume, observes the tendency of the
NRPs to subsidize their agricultural sectors at a later stage.

But

this is after they have permitted this sector to fulfill its historical
mission, essential to the success of the system's development effort in
the first place.

Apparently in this area as well as in the field of

social security, welfare legislation, etc. the successful NRPs also
become subject to "rich man's" diseases.
In the NRR, by contrast, we witness more of an implicit assumption
(somewhat modified in recent years) that there is no need to have an
agricultural revolution, and that the agricultural sector can be
discriminated against from the outset by means of the covert policies
of government intervention, as we have already seen, as well as by the
more overt biases in allocating human and physical infrastucture.

It

is very difficult to move towards a market oriented approach and
liberalization as long as the rent seeking political forces deny
farmers the purchasing power which rightly belongs to them.
The requirement of balanced rural growth to propel the economy
forward also carries with it the need for a more participatory or
"open" educa ti,on system, focussed on primary education in the rural
areas rather than higher education for the urban elite.

may

In fact, it

be helpful to take a brief synoptic look at contrasting educational

policy and expenditure patterns in the NRR·and NRP cases.

Table 4a

indicated that the NRP governments generally spend somewhat more on
education than the NRRs even though they undoubtedly start with
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somewhat higher levels of human capital in place at the outset. 10

But

what is certainly as significant is the much greater emphasis on

ensuring a broadly based primary cum secondary education structure over
time in the NRP cases (see table 4b).

This is reflected both in public

sector expenditure allocations and, more subtly, in the much greater
access to talent via competitive examinations at every level.

There

can be little doubt that the necessity of relying more on one's wits-
or, if one prefers, less on the ability to "afford" education as an
elite consumption good--is reflected in both the educational policies
and expenditure patterns under observation in the NRPs.
Since newly independent governments normally face demands for
spending that easily exceed available revenue, as well as for imports
in excess of export earnings, other means must be found to deal with
deficits.

This holds for NRRs as well as NRPs.

In East Asia in the

1950s the inflow of foreign aid, mainly from the United States, was
helpful in that context, as was the inflow of private foreign capital
in the '60s and '70s.

While concessional capital inflows played an

important historical role both in filling governments' budget gaps and
helping to combat inflation, it is wrong to assume that foreign capital
was of overriding importance in financing overall capital accumulation

during the past three decades in the NRP cases, as is sometimes
asserted.

Even if this may seem to bold for South Korea, foreign

capital amounted to only 7% of cumulative investment in Taiwan, the
most successful LDC, over that period (see Table 5).

The NRRs have

received as much, if not more, foreign capital (measured either on a
per capita basis or as a percentage of the total investment fund), so
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it can hardly be said that the relatively greater success of the NRPs
is due to the greater generosity of foreign friends and investors.
More generally, while aid was admittedly qualitatively important
at particular points in time in helping, say the Taiwan Government, to
accept and bind up the wounds of policy change, the quantitative role
of foreign aid, not dominant throughout, declined steadily after the
mid-'50s, and was completely phased out by the early '60s. 11

It seems

generally true for the East Asians, certainly including historical
Japan, and with only Korea as something of a deviant, 12 that, with the
exception of emergencies such as earthquakes, floods, or droughts,
foreign aid in the sense of open-ended, long range resource transfers
to help growth is not really needed.

Where it can be very helpful is

in terms of particular timely infusions, or what may be called the
temporary "ballooning" of aid, in relation to major policy changes
which governments may be ready to undertake. 13
With respect to the official attitude towards private capital,
both direct foreign investment and, later, commercial bank or portfolio
investments, we may again note the role of "synthetic nationalism",
under which foreign intrusions into the domestic market are often
resented.

Not needing to "create" a nationalist spirit and national

self-confidence at the outset also meant a greater willingness by the
early '60s to accept private foreign capital and foreign companies in
substantial quantities in Taiwan. 14

This early evolution away from

synthetic nationalism moved the system in the direction of a greater
integration of its financial markets with those of the rest of the
world, even if the full liberalization of the capital market was
clearly postponed and is only now under full consideration.
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Ve can thus also observe a gradual depoliticiz ation of long term
capital movements via the replacement of politically negotiated foreign
aid by the inflow of private foreign investment induced by the market,
as foreign investors sought to combine their capital and technology
with the abundant labor supplies of Taiwan.

The fact that foreign

investment increased substantial ly, in spite of the shift of diplomatic
recognition from Taiwan to the Mainland in the '70s, is a powerful
indicator of the gradual integration of the East Asian economies into
world markets.

Increased levels of foreign investment over time, as

comparative advantage changed rapidly, can be viewed not simply as a
means of attracting capital or providing employment for the surplus
labor population, but also as a vehicle for transferring technologie s
which could then be adapted to Taiwan's own requirement s.

But full

integration into internation al capital markets, short or long term, was
delayed.

Such a reduction of capital controls and the accompanyin g

increase in competitive pressure for industry and banking, likely to
facilitate a more rapid transfer and adaptation of technology, is only
now being fully considered.
Our sixth important policy parameter for considerati on is, of
course, the wage rate, or more precisely, the extent of interventio n in
the unskilled non-agricu ltural labor market.

As we have seen, the

initial land/labor ratios in the NRR and NRP cases differ markedly,
presumably leading to higher equilibrium levels of real wages in the
former.

But what is of special interest to us here is the extent to

which governments intervene, especially in urban labor markets, and the

politico-eco nomic reasons for doing so.

It is well recognized, for

example, that unionism and minimum wage legislation had much greater
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strength in the NRR than in the NRP cases.

Unionism is, in fact, a

phenomenon which may be said to be primarily political, stemming from
governments ' efforts to establish a political base and demonstrate a
sense of strength among urban workers.

It is thus very much related,

on the one hand, to the existence or non-existen ce of an initial
"organic nationalism " (the need to create .cohesion among the citizens
of a society) as well as, on the other hand, to the existence or non
existence of natural resources to pay for what might be considered
elite benefits accruing to a small minority of the laboring class.
While the wages, benefits and prestige of the, usually 5-10%, of the
industrial working class which may be termed "organized" can indeed by
raised by direct interventio n, the impact on that class as a whole is
likely to be negative.

As long as a "labor surplus" condition exists-

definable in terms of relatively unskilled workers--un ions' ability to
raise real wag.es, like the effect of minimum wage legislation , depend
almost entirely on government actions and support.

However, no one can

successfull y "legislate" against the endowment; such measures are
capable only of raising real wages for an elite sub-group of workers at
the expense of wa·ge incomes for the major! ty--even if union and
government pronounceme nts invariably pretend to argue the case for the
entire working class.
"Premature" (before the unskilled labor supply is absorbed)
urban-rural wage differentia ls ~an, of course, be a serious handicap
for societies potentially in a position to export labor intensive
manufacture d goods to world markets.

They are bound to induce the

wrong choice of technology and the wrong choice in the direction of
technology change.

Thus, a minority, perhaps as few as 10% of the
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workers in the non-agricultur al sector, may effectively deprive their
non-unionized colleagues of employment opportunities and deny the
country the comparative advantage of lower labor costs in competitive
markets.

In the presence of natural resource generated rents it is

possible for a bilateral oligopoly between industrialists and elite
workers to divide up these rents in a bilateral bargain.

In the

absence of such rents, a labor surplus country clearly faces a choice
between high wages for a minority and unemployment for the majority,
and is likely to find it politically difficult to maintain a favored
position for the few under those circumstances.

It is this difference,

and not simply the presence of a "repressive" set of governments, whic~
led to the virtuai absence of a politicized militant unionism in the
NRP's, at least prior to the advent of labor shortage in the 1970s.
In the NRRs, on the other hand, union activism is usually an
endemic component of the politicized development process we have been
describing.

As inflation impacts certain groups at the expense of

others, unions may gain strength by leading protests, and usually
achieve a perpetuation of their bilateral bargains with capitalists at

the expense of the majority of non-union workers.

Union power is

really given by the government, and can be taken away by the
government.

Two monopolistic powers, the money printing state and the

wage gap creating union, can thus combine to create a situation which

is often detrimental to the well being of the working people of a.
developing country, as well as to the growth of the system as a whole-
certainly before all the labor surplus has been mopped up.
As we have already noted, given the scarcity of natural resources,

the NRPs primary import substitution sub-phase (s ) is likely to be
1
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both short and, judging from the way the major policy instruments are
exercised, not as severe as in the NRR case.

The comparative severity

of the government's interventionist impact in the two cases can be seen
mainly via comparative rates of monetary expansion, the level of the
real rate of interest, the exchange rate, the rate of protection, the
rate of taxation and the organized sector's unskilled real wage rate.
There exists an inherent tendency for inflation to result if restraint
is not exercised in deploying these tools of government intervention.
When deployed over extended periods of time in the fashion typical of
the NRR import substitution regime, they are likely to undermine the
ultimate success of the very growth oriented strategy they are intended
to serve.
What is basically at work here is the relatively greater ability
of the East Asian NRP to renounce the exercise of political muscle to
"manufacture" purchasing power, in sharp contrast to the more typical
Latin American NRR.

It is this renouncing of power, or better, the

more restrained exe-rcise of power via "on the table" rather than "under
the table" actions which is part of the deliberate trend towards NRP

....

liberalization •. Such a depoliticization of the system implies that the
government gradually learns to be more responsible and open about what
it is doing, moves away from implicit taxes and covert transfers, and
towards explicit and more equitable and efficient types of influences
on the economy.

The willingness to avoid monetary expansion and the

rejection of the printing press as a dependable source of revenue,
represent an important part of this liberalization movement.

In

monetary policy it means permitting the interest rate as well as the
exchange rate to assume levels which might be closer to equilibrium
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over time.

With less financial repression it also means greater

reliance on a competitive institutional credit structure and the
commercial banking system.

The importance of policies which induce

human resources to take over from natural resources in the NRP setting
is indicated by the fact that gradual liberalization permits the
opening up of opportunities not only for cultivating· peasant
households, but also for middle and small scale industrial
entrepreneurs in the rural areas--in strong distinction to what goes on
in the more typical large scale urban-oriented NRR case.
The liberalization process described for Taiwan of course has both
a domestic and an international dimension.

Domestically, the movement

implies a reduction of government controls in order to accelerate the
growth of saving and investment and the broader participation of human
resources.

Internationally , liberalization means an opening up of the

economy with respect to trade and finance, and therefore, enhanced
economic integration with the rest of the world.

Such an enhanced

external orientation, of course, carries dynamic efficiency advantages
as well as static gains from trade.

Once domestic entrepreneurs become

subject to the rigors of international competition, as they are forced
to compete in world markets, they come to recognize the merits of
quality and price, and cease being a captive audience, as domestic
consumers are.

Instead, they become increasingly competitive risk

takers, innovators, and production managers in the context of a
"learning by doing" process.
The enhanced international competitivenes s of the NRP case
warrants mention for a number of reasons.

One is that while a producer

may dominate a local market, in the international arena the situation
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is much more likel y to be work ably comp etitiv e~

The more

economy to impo rts and forei gn comp etitio n, the more
this helps to
contr ol dome stic mark et power as well as to force
dome stic
entre prene urs to selec t more appr opria te techn ologi
es and innov ate in
more appro priat e direc tions --bot h in the proce ss
and in the produ ct
sens e. As long as tradi tiona l impo rt subs titut ion
strat egie s are
main taine d, and dome stic manu factu rers are shelt ered
by poli tical
mean s, an inten se fear of forei gn comp etitio n is
grad ually buil t up.
This repre sents one of the more vicio us of the vario
us vicio us circl es
of devel opme nt: the fear gene rated under poli tical
prote ction in turn
· gene rates demand for more polit ical patro nage , and
for conti nued impo rt
subs tituti on.ev en when the initi al infan t indu stry
ar~um ent has long
lost iis valid ity. This is very mu~h a featu re of
the natu ral

resou rces rich Latin Amer ican scene .

It is only expe rienc e in world

mark ets durin g an ·exte rnal orien tatio n phase which
can depen dably allay
these fears .
Ve have alrea dy noted that, while Taiwan shift ed
from quan titati ve
restr ictio ns to tarif fs durin g her prima ry impo rt
subs titut ion subph ase
and thus provi ded grea ter acces s to comp etitiv e impo
rts and a mild er
form of infan t indu stry prote ction , her over all leve
ls of tarif f
prote ction did not dimin ish sharp ly for some time.
This is becau se the
effec tive rate of prote ction , unlik e the other instr
umen ts of polic y
previ ously refer red to, is not as s~ns itive to exter
nal shor t term
fluct uatio ns, and there fore it is not as vital that
it be reduc ed early
on. It is, more over, a fact that a too early radic
al redu ction of
tarif fs could emba rrass a gover nmen t by reduc ing
reven ues befor e
alter nativ es are in place or befor e indu stria lists
have gaine d some
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confidence that they can manage competitive ly, and thus force a general
policy reversal.
What Taiwan did instead was adopt a customs rebate system in the
late '50s and a policy of export processing zones in the '60s,
amounting to a partial liberalizat ion of trade as a first step.

While

the full meaning of liberalizat ion is not to bias a system in favor of
exports but to provide a more equitable game, this may have to be done
in stages.

Tariffs were further reduced in 1971, with the executive

branch given the authority, without additional legislative approval, to
adjust tariffs downward by up to 50%.

Further across the board tariff

reductions have taken place in the '80s but, as is well known, Taiwan
today is still far from a free trade paragon.

Her efforts at partial

trade liberalizati on by first eliminating quantitativ e controls,
subsequentl y introducing tariff rebates and export processing zones,
and only then reducing tariffs, permitted some industries to continue
to be protected and remain isolated from internation al competition as
long as they only sold in the domestic market.

This policy made it

possible to continue to coerce the consuming public by political force
in these areas, not only to pay import duties, but also to pay for the
inefficienc y of those protected industries.

On

the other hand,

gradually and selectively , export oriented sectors increased their
efficiency through the rebate system and the export processing zones in
areas in which the government gave up its political power.

Since the

government is clearly unable to coerce foreign consumers to pay for the
inefficienc y of domestic producers, these are also the industries which

were the first to reduce their costs under the newly competitive
pressures.
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I hope it is by now clear that the gradual trend towards
liberalization during the transition growth process which we have
described here does not imply anything like a shift towards laissez
faire and an abandonment by the government of its major economic

role.

15

What it does imply is that the NRP government gradually

abandons its "under the table" efforts at shifting resources from some
groups to others, including itself, via the exercise of its monopoly
power in the fiscal and monetary arenas.

For domestic monetary policy

this means that, since the government cannot control both price and

quantity, it must focus increasingly on quantity and let price (the
interest rate) be market determined.

In the case of foreign exchange

management the same principle implies an increasing focus on the
quantity of reserves and a more clearly (and cleanly) floating foreign
exchange rate.

This means vie~ing money increasingly as a medium of

exchange required for the internal division of labor, and viewing
foreign exchange reserves increasingly as a medium of exchange required
to take advantage

of

the international division of labor.

In this

sense gradual liberalization is consonant with the notion that money is
not simply purchasing power that can be artificially created to achieve
socially desirable purposes, such as transferring profits among
interest groups.
Increasingly the view of a more independent central bank also
means that the government must replace covert income transfers by

explicit taxation, with consent.

Basically what is involved here is

avoiding the misapplication of the short run Keynesian message (that
large government deficits do not matter, that inflation is always cost
pushed, that an increase in the supply of money always lowers the rate
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of interest, that

commercil bank lending does not represent the

creation of purchasing power for investment finance, and that
governments can and should manage economic affairs in general) to the
development problem.

The more or less linear trend toward

liberalization in East Asia has depended to a large extent on a change
in monetary thinking in regard to the role of money·

as a

medium of

exchange rather than as a means of providing purchasing power to the
government, as well as on a different attitude toward the accumulation
of foreign exchange reserves.

As we have seen, such policy parameters as the interest rate, the
foreign exchange rate, and the growth rate of the money supply are the
instruments which constitute the core of the politicization mechanism
during import substitution, and of possible depoliticization
thereafter.

In the NRP case they are used less and less over time as

policy ins~ruments to promote growth, with the government more and more
assuming the role of a direct actor, as "on the table" taxes and
e~eenditure patterns emerge, including a continued important role for
public enterprise.

Public enterprise in the East Asian countries, in

fact, continues to extend substantially into directly productive

activities, well beyond traditional areas of public goods or external
economies. 16

Domestic financial markets remain protected and

underdeveloped to this day, rendering it difficult to collect a
sufficient volume of savings to permit some relatively large scale
activities to take place.

This bottleneck has become more important of

late as Taiwan's comparative advantage has continued to evolve in favor
of capital and technology intensive output mixes.

Consequently, we may

note that, while the relative role of public enterprise in directly
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- productiv e activitie s declined during the '60s, it is currently again
on the upswing.

Liberaliz ation in this area, which may entail some

privatiza tion, has clearly been given a lower temporal priority and
■ust

await improveme nts in the capital market.

Currently , as the NRP enters the era of science and technolog y
based productio n and exports, it has also turned to changes in the
patent and trade-mar k laws as an indicatio n of its perceived need for
more indigenou s innovatio ns in the context of the internati onal

technolog y transfer environme nt which has itself undergone marked
changes.

The Taiwan Governme nt, for example, has played an

increasin gly active role in providing for an improvem ent in the science
and technolog y environm ent, including support for R&D, especiall y where
external economies of sufficien t magnitude exist so that individua l
private enterpris es can't be expected to meet the costs.

Its current

reexamina tion of the required level of taxes, including the possibili ty
of a value added tax, relates to the need for additiona l resources to

provide for the explicit expenditu res of the mainline ministrie s where
overhead creation is required, as well as to meet the costs of a second
land reform (land. consolida tion in agricultu re, and the creation of new
large-sca le public enterpris es in non-agric ulture).
Vhen the natural resources base is substanti al and increasin g in
importanc e (the NRR case) both foreign exchange accumula tion and
agricultu re based taxes are likely to be substant ial, especiall y when
the terms of trade are favorable .

This often leads to the temptatio n

to increase governmen t expenditu res out of line with long run
realities , especiall y once the terms of trade turn down.

In the NRP

case much more caution is likely to be exercised , given the need to
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shift taxes rather quickly from the natural resources to the human
resources basis of production, likewise with respect to foreign
exchange reserves.
Finally, an interesting and more complicated question is sometimes
raised concerning the type of government required to carry out
liberalization in a systematic, or more or less linear, fashion.

It is

argued that the problem with the East Asian case is that it seems to
require a more or less hard, or authoritarian, type of government not
acceptable to many of the contemporary LDC's.

One could, of course,

. point out that there are many authoritarian governments (including some
in Latin America) which have, in fact, been signally unsuccessful in
effecting a_ successful transition.

Ve also do not know what the

prov~rbial man on the street would. choose if confronted with the stark
inevitability of a trade-off.

What does seem to hold is that

successful liberalization, once under way, is likely to mean moving in
a direction in which organizational choices, like the structure of the

system itself, ultimately approach those of a developed country-
including an increasing role for markets and an increasing pluralism
within the society in general.

This certainly seems to be happening

·now, if not very rapidly, in contemporary South Korea and Taiwan.

But

at what stage in the transition process economic pluralism must be
supported by political pluralism is less clear.

The covert forms of

income transfers typically seem to linger longer when a system is not
yet politically a pluralistic society in which each of the multiplicity
of interest groups can exercise only re_latively small influence on the
political stage and countervailing power exists.

Yet we also know that

the costs and benefits of overt government policy cannot be calculated,
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. debated, or compromised as readily ~~ when political parties vie
with each other in promising visible actions to various vocal, if often
elite, minority interest groups.
It is difficult indeed to render a comparative judgment on Latin
American versus East Asian authoritaria nism, either in terms of its
parliamenta ry or human rights dimension.

It is much easier to compare

performance in terms of the speed of transition, growth, equity
improvement or poverty alleviation .

Yet we are prepared to argue that

parliamenta ry trappings may, in fact, constitute an aspect of the
synthetic nationalism which we see as an obstacle to early economic
liberalizati on.

If we assume, for example, that the quality of the

policy makers in the East Asian and Latin American contexts are
equivalent, it may well be true that acting sensibly in response to
that vision may be easier for policy makers in more authoritari an NRP
governments which can take a longer view and need worry less about
placating public opinion or their early reelection.

In such a

situation "accommoda ting" sequential policy reforms might be more
readily carried out with less likelihood of interest group protests,
public demonstrati ons or, worse, military coups.
But we also know that economic liberalizat ion via enhanced
mobility and participatio n is something which can be achieved in one or
two decades.

The emergence of an authentic differentia ted political

pluralism, on the other hand, is just as clearly a more long run
organizatio nal accomplishm ent different from the trappings of a multi
party system, and has to be dealt with differently .

We must indeed try

to distinguish between political pluralism as a plaything of the urban
elite, and mass participatio n plus the protection of habeas corpus for
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the many -- just as we endeavor to assess the extent of participation
and mobility in economic affairs by means of equity and poverty
alleviation indices.
In sum, an ample natural resource endowment, like an ample supply
of foreign capital available for the asking, can be a mixed blessing
for the developing society attempting transition to modern growth.
Such an abundance of resources contains the seeds of a generalized
"Dutch Disease" phenomenon extending well beyond the narrow impact on
the exchange rate.

On

the one hand, it provides rents for both private

parties and public decision makers which will likely induce second-best
critical choices in the economic policy arena.

On

the other hand, it

increases the society's exposure to terms of trade fluctuations and
enhances the tendency over time to oscillate between liberalization
episodes and retreats to import substitution policies.

The problem is

not that more natural resources (like more foreign capital) can't be
good for you--but that instead of being used to ease the pain of
change, they are likely to be used to postpone change.

Like

individuals, societies which are not "up against it" prefer to avoid
sustained changes in the policy mix which are perceived as potentially
painful by powerful vested interest groups. 17

The natural resource

poor society, on the other hand, is forced to "bite the bullet", so to
speak; by not being able to put off the day of reckoning it is much

more likely to begin relying in a sustained fashion on its human

resources.

This, in turn, implies a more competitive system over time,

and a greater flexibility in the capacity to adjust to the inevitable

changes in the international environment.

And finally -- though here

we are admittedly on more speculative grounds -- the productive
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partici pation of the majori ty resulti ng from the sequen tial
liberal ization in various market s is likely to genera te its own
pressur e for a gradua l liberal ization in the politic al sphere as well.
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Table 1
Natural Resource·Endowments

Country

Land/Man Ratio
in acres
per capita

Taiwan

0.2 acres

Forests

cover 55,;
of land area

Minerals

Rivers

Fuels

Not rich in
minerals.
Relatively
abundant salt,
limestone,
silicone sands,
dolani te, talc,
low grade
graphite.
Limited sulfur,
pyrite, low grade
copper, gold.

Ample coking
coal, bad
quality
bituninous
coal, sane
natural gas,
little petroleun.

Large
hydroelectric
potential.

'

KOl"ea

0.2

depleted,
acute shortage,
sane reforestation

poor quality
anthracite coal,
small deposits
of bismuth,
graphite,
gold, silver, iron
ore, coppe:-.
Among largest
in world deposits
of tungsten.

poor quality
coal, no
petroleun

little
importance.
Sane hydroelectric
potential.

Colanbia

2.6 acres

valuable timber,
sanewhat depleted

iron o:-e,
copper, salt,
gold, SilVe:',
p!atimr.:., leac,
me:-ciry, -wo:-ld
!c:nous ene.-al cs,

large coal
reserves,
large
petroleum.

large
hyd.""oelectric

Substantial
coal deposits
of limited
value, large
petroleum
reserves.

L2."'ge
hyc:-oelectric
potential;
poo:naYi ga:iili ty.

pot.en:.ia.!.

U!"S!".it:I!S.

Mexico

6 acres

cover 20i
of a."'ea

P.ic.l'l de~sit.s.
Zinc, lead,
silver, iron
ere, me:-ciry,
s..!fl.r",an:.imony
molybde."lu:n

Sigru.fica"lt
deposits~ ot.l'le:industrial mine:-als.
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Tabl e 2
Tabl e 2a
Aver age Annu al Real Per Capi ta GDP Growth Rate
(% Year )
1950 -59

1960 -69

1970 -79

1980 -84

Taiwan

4.7 ('52 -'59 )

5.9

8.1

3.9 ('80 -'83 )

Sout h Korea

1.3 ('53 -'59 )

4.9

1.s

3.1

Colombia

1.7 ('51 -'59 )

1.9

3.9

.4 ('80 -'82 )

Mexico

3.4 ('52 -'59 )

4.1

1.9

.1

Indic es in UN, Stat istic al Year book , vario us
year s. Robe rt Summers and Alan
Hest on, "Imp roved Inte rnat iona l Com paris on of
Real Prod uct and its
Com posit ion," The Review of Income and Weal th
30, (Jun e, 1984 ); pp. 207- 262.
Stat istic al Year book of the Repu blic of Chin
a, (Tai pei: Dire ctor ate Gene ral of
Budg et, Acco untin g and Stat istic s, vario us year
s).

Tabl e 2b
Income Dist ribu tion
(Gin i Coe ffici ents )
1953
Taiw an

.56

-1960

1970

1980

.44 ('59 )

.29

.29 (197 8)

.37

.38 (197 6)

.53

.56

.52 (198 2)

.54

.58

.so

Sout h Korea
Colombia
Mexico

--

(197 7)

Jain , Shal l, Size Dist ribu tion of Incom e, (Was
hingt on, D.C. : The World Bank ,
1975 ).
Fei, Rani s, Kuo, Growth with Equi ty: The Taiw
an Case , Oxfo rd Pres s, 1979 .
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Table 2c
Agricultu ral Exports as Share of Total Exports
(Percent)
1950
Taiwan

1960

1970

1980

51.7

22.5

10.2

South Korea

82.3

51.4

16.7

8.9

Colombia

83.1

78.9

81.2

76.7

Mexico

53.5

64.1

48.8

14.2

Table 2d
Mineral Exports as Share of Total Exports
(Percent)
1950

1960

1970

1980

2.1

0.7

3.6,

· ll.2

8.3

8.3

10.5

Colombia

16.3

18.9

10.8

2.9

Mexico

38.6

24.0

21.2

71.6

Taiwan
South Korea

Table 2e
Manufactu red Exports as a Share of Total Exports
(Percent)
1950
Taiwan

1960

1970

1980

46.2

76.8

86.2

South Korea

6.4

40.3

74.9

80.2

Colombia

o.5

1.4

8.0

19. 7

Mexico

7.9

U.9

30.0

10.9

Indices in UNCTAD, Yearbook of Trade and Developm ent Statistic s, various
years. Agricultu ral exports a SITC 0+-1+2-2. 7-2.8+4; mineral exports+ SITC
2.7+2.8+3 +6.7+6.8; manufactu red exports• SITC 5+6-6.7-6 .8+7+8.
The Trade of China:
1982).

(Taipei:

Inspector ate General of Customs, Statistic s,
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Tabl e 2f
Expo rt Orie ntati on Rati o
(Exp orts/ GDP :

Perc ent)

1950

1960

1970

1980

10. 1

11.1

29.6

52.2

2.1

3.3

14.3

37.7

Colombia

10.9

15.7

14 •.6

16.3

Mexico

17 .o

10.6

8.2

22.4

Taiwan
·Sout h Korea

IMF, Year book , vario us year s.

World Bank , World Tabl es, 1980 .

Nati onal Income of the Repu blic of China (Tai
pei: Dire ctora te Gene ral of
Budg et, Acco untin g and Stat istic s, vario us year
s).
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Table l
Table la
Tax Rate
(% of GDP)

1950

1960

1970

11 ('52)

11

14

17 ('79)

S. Korea

6 ('53)

10

16.

18

Colombia

3

4

9 ('72)

10

Mexico

8

7

9

13 ('75)

Taiwan

1980

Table lb
Composition of Taxes
(Customs duties/total taxes)

1950

1960

1970

1980

Taiwan

26 ('52)

23

28

24

S. Korea

17 ('53)

21

13

12

Colombia

18

27

19 ('72)

18

Mexico

34

31

20

11

Table le
Real Effective Exchange Rates
(1975=100)

1965
Taiwan

1970

1980

96.17

95.50

S. Korea

98.18

73.00

94.84

Colombia

79.71

81.20

81.73
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Table 4
Education Expenditures

Table 4a
Public Expenditure on Education As % of GNP
1972

1981

Taiwan

3.5%

4.5% (includes science and culture)

S. Korea

3.0%

3.4%

Colombia

2.9%

2.9%

Mexico

2.0%

3.8% (1982)

Table 4b
Public Expenditure on Education By Level·
Percent per level (of funds allocated by level)

Higher
1972
1981
n/a
18.1%

Taiwan ( 1968)

Primary
1972
1981
n/a
37.5%

Secondary
1972
1981
n/a
44.4%

s.

Korea

65.4%

69.1%

26.5%

19.4%

8.0%

11.5%

Colombia

53.8%

48.6%

23.7%

27.6%

22.5%

23.8%

Mexico

56.2%

46.2% ('82)

22.8%

21.9% ('82)

21.0%

32.0% ('82)

Sources:

UN National Accounts Statistics; Taiwan Statistical Data Book;

UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks.
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Table 5
Share of Foreign Capital Inflow in Total Investment (Cumulative)

Country

Years
1956-1983

Taiwan

Korea

22.2

1953-1983

Colombia

14.5

1956-1982

Mexico

20.3

1960-1982

Sources:

International Financial Statistics, Taiwan Statistical Data Book.

